Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1990

Grant Davidson v. Erwin M. Prince, Folkens
Brothers Trucking : Brief in Opposition to
Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jeffrey C. Peatross; Ivie and Young; Attorneys for Appellant.
H. James Clegg, Robert C. Keller; Snow, Christensen and Martineau; Attorneys for Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Response to Petition for Certiorari, Davidson v. Prince, No. 900461.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3217

This Response to Petition for Certiorari is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Utah Supreme Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEAL^
3RIEF
UTAH
DOC A ::*';"
K FU
50
.A10
DOCKET NO.

Witi-cft

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GRANT DAVIDSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 910321
ERWIN M. PRINCE, and FOLKENS
BROTHERS TRUCKING,
Defendants/Appellees.

APPELLEES' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 900461-CA
JEFFREY C. PEATROSS
IVIE & YOUNG
48 North University Avenue
P. 0. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorneys for Appellant
H. JAMES CLEGG
ROBERT C. KELLER
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Appellees

•

i L tz
AUG 7 1991

CLERK SUPRfcME COURT,
UTAH

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GRANT DAVIDSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 910321
ERWIN M. PRINCE, and FOLKENS
BROTHERS TRUCKING,
Defendants/Appellees.

APPELLEES* BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 900461-CA
JEFFREY C. PEATROSS
IVIE & YOUNG
48 North University Avenue
P. 0. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorneys for Appellant
H. JAMES CLEGG
ROBERT C. KELLER
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. 0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Appellees

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1

REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL REPORT OF OPINION ISSUED BY THE COURT
OF APPEALS

1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS

1

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

ARGUMENTS AGAINST ISSUANCE OF A WRIT
1.
The Court of Appeals Did Not Err in Refusing to
Remand This Case for a New Trial Simply Because
the Trial Court Instructed the Jury That Any
Personal-Injury Award Would Not Be Subject to
Federal Income Tax

4

2.

3.

4

The Court of Appeals Did Not Err in Upholding the
Trial Court Exclusion of a Legal Conclusion by
Plaintiff's Expert

6

The Court of Appeals Did Not Err in Upholding the
Trial Courtfs Admission into Evidence of a Factual
Statement in a Demand Letter For Purposes Relating
to Credibility

8

CONCLUSION

11

-i-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Davidson v. Prince, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. 58
(CA, 6/18/91)

1, 5, 7, 8

Knapstad v. Smith's Management Corp., 774 P.2d 1
(Utah App. 1989)

4

Slusher v. Ospital, 777 P.2d 437 (Utah 1989)
United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v.
Olympia Wings, Inc., 896 F»2d 949 (5th Cir. 1990)

10
...

10

Rules
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

1

Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence

7

Rule 408, Utah Rules of Evidence

8-10

Rule 701, Utah Rules of Evidence

7

Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence

7

Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence

7

Other Authorities
J. Moore Moore's Federal Practice § 408.04, 704.02
(1988 & Supp. 1990)

-ii-

7, 8

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred by not requiring a

new trial in this case simply because the trial court instructed
the jury that any personal-injury judgment awarded plaintiff
would not be subject to federal income taxation;
2.

whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the

trial court's decision to disallow expert testimony in the form
of a legal conclusion; and
3.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the

trial court's admission into evidence of a factual statement
contained in a demand letter for purposes relating to
credibility.
REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL REPORT OF OPINION
ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
Davidson v. Prince, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. 58 (CA, 6/18/91).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS
Appellees Erwin M. Prince and Folkens Brothers Trucking
("Prince") do not dispute the Statement of Jurisdiction of
appellant Grant Davidson ("Davidson").
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
No error in either of the admission or the
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect
in any ruling or order or in anything done or
omitted by the court or by any of the
parties, is grounds for granting a new trial
or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order,

unless refusal to take such action appears to
the court inconsistent with substantial
justice. The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect
in the proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.
Jn addition, Prince adopts the statement of Determinative
Rules set forth in Davidson's Petition for Certiorari and the
addendum thereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
For purposes of opposing this petition, Prince does not
contest Davidson's recitation of the procedural history of this
action.

However, Davidson's Statement of Facts omits certain

facts necessary to the Court of Appeals' decision, which Prince
includes herein as follows:
1.

Although the trial court did not allow Davidson's

expert to express his legal conclusion that Prince was negligent,
pursuant to questions by Davidson's counsel, the expert did
present his opinion to the jury as to, inter alia:

(i) the

reason Prince's truck overturned while going around the curve;
(ii) that the truck was traveling too fast for the curve; (iii)
what the speed of truck was as it went through the curve; (iv)
what the speed limit was at the curve; (v) that a person hauling
livestock should be concerned with his load and what the concern
shculd be; and (vi) that a person hauling livestock could foresee
the possibility of injury if the truck overturned.
Trial Transcript ["PTT"] at pp. 14-22.)
-2-

(Partial

2.

One of the theories presented to the jury by Prince's

counsel was that Davidson was contributorily negligent in causing
his own injuries because when Davidson saw the steer that had
been released from Prince!s truck laying beside the railroad
tracks in an area bounded by a right-of-way fence, Davidson
approached too closely to the animal, causing the animal to get
to its feet and chase him.

(Supplemental Partial Trial

Transcript ["SPTT"] at pp. 50-51.)
3.

During depositions and at trial, Davidson had testified

to a number of different distances from which he first approached
the steer.

He stated variously, for example, that the distance

was 40 feet, 30 feet, 25 feet, 22 feet and 20 feet.

(PTT at pp.

45-46.)
4.

Davidson had also written a demand letter to Prince's

insurer stating that the distance from which he had approached
the steer was actually 10 feet.

The trial court allowed Prince's

counsel to refresh Davidson's recollection, or to impeach
Davidson's credibility, solely with the 10-foot statement
contained in the letter.
5.

(SPTT at pp. 47-48.)

After the parties had rested, the trial court

instructed the jury as to damages.

The court informed the jury

that its duty was, inter alia, to determine the amount of damages
it found "from a preponderance of the evidence would fairly and
adequately compensate the plaintiff for any injury and loss

-3-

plaintiff may have sustained as a result of the accident and
injuries complained of by plaintiff."
6.

(R. 221.)

The court also instructed the jury it f,was not

permitted to award speculative damages, by which term is meant
compensation for detriment which, although possible, is remote,
conjectural or speculative."

The court then stated in pertinent

part as follows:
In determining the amount of the damages, you
may not include in, or add to an otherwise
just award any sum for the purpose of
punishing the defendants, or to serve as an
example or warning for others. In addition,
you may not include in your award any sum for
court costs or attorneys' fees. Neither may
any sum of money be added to that amount for
federal income taxes. I charge you as a
matter of law that the amount award by your
verdict is exempt from federal income
taxation.
(R. 225, 229.)
ARGUMENTS AGAINST ISSUANCE OF A WRIT
1.

The Court of Appeals Did Not Err in Refusing to Remand
This Case for a New Trial Simply Because the Trial
Court Instructed the Jury That Any Personal-Injury
Award Would Not Be Subject to Federal Income Tax.

Davidson's first argument that certiorari is necessary in
this case is predicated on the assumption that the jury
instruction at issue so "tends to mislead the jury" that it is
grounds for reversible error under Knapstad v. Smith's Management
Corp. , 774 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1989).
Certiorari at pp. 6-7.

See Petition for

In support of this argument, Davidson
-4-

relies wholly on the Court of Appeals1 express determination that
1,1

the effect of [the instruction at issue] on the jury!s ultimate

damage award is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
determine.fn

Id. citing Davidson v. Prince, Slip Op. filed

6/18/91, at p. 8.
Davidson's argument fails, however, simply because contrary
to Davidson's conclusory assumption, there is absolutely no
showing that the instruction at issue tended to mislead the jury
in any respect whatsoever.1

Rather, the jury was properly

instructed that if Davidson was entitled to recover, it should
award damages that would "fairly and adequately compensate the
plaintiff for any injury and loss plaintiff may have sustained as
a result of the accident and injuries complained of by
plaintiff."

The jury was instructed that it was not permitted to

award "speculative damages, by which term is meant compensation
for detriment which, although possible, [was] remote, conjectural
or speculative."

Davidson

simply does not and cannot contend

that he was actually entitled to additional damages based upon
the mistaken belief that a portion of the verdict would be used
to pay taxes.

a

This is not in any way inconsistent with the Court of
Appeals' determination. Obviously, there is a marked difference
between an instruction whose effect is difficult or impossible to
determine, which by its very description does not require the
expense of a new trial, and an instruction that in fact tends to
mislead the jury, which may require reversal.
-5-

Thus, the charge correctly reflected that Davidson was
entitled to fair compensation for any injuries and losses caused
by Prince's negligence.

The instructions given, read together,

merely serve to caution the jury to base its award on the
evidence, not on speculation as to tax consequences, and it
nowhere appears how the instructions given in this case adversely
affected Davidson's substantial rights.

Under the circumstances,

the instruction did not in fact tend to mislead the jury, and
thus did nothing to require reversal of the jury's verdict.
2.

The Court of Appeals Did Not Err in Upholding the Trial
Court Exclusion of a Legal Conclusion by Plaintiff's
Expert.

Davidson also argues that certiorari is necessary here
because the Court of Appeals' decision will somehow "drastically
alter the use of expert testimony in personal injury actions or
other cases involving negligence or other legally cognizable
breaches of duty."

See Petition for Certiorari at p. 10.

Davidson states in support of this argument that the world is
increasingly complex and the testimony of his expert involved
elements of physics and other sciences which "can be extremely
difficult for a lay person to grasp."

id.

There is no reason for certiorari here, however, because
again there is no showing to support Davidson's conclusory
assertions.

First, the exclusion of a legal conclusion under the

circurstances of this case in no way alters the common law of
-6-

this state or restricts the use of proper expert testimony.

In

fact, as the Court of Appeals notes, Davidson's expert was
allowed to give his opinion as to, inter alia, the reason
Prince!s truck overturned while going around the curve, that the
truck was traveling too fast for the curve, what the speed of
truck was as it went through the curve, what the speed limit was
at the curve, that a person hauling livestock should be concerned
with his load and what the concern should be, and that a person
hauling livestock could foresee the possibility of injury if the
truck overturned.

All the expert was not allowed to do was give

a legal conclusion.
Under such circumstances, the exclusion does not alter Utah
law in the slightest.

fll

[W]hile [Rule 704] permits expert

opinion testimony on an ultimate issue, Rule 704 does not mean
that all opinions are admissible into evidence.

Rules 701 and

702 require, respectively, that the opinions . . . assist the
trier of fact.

And Rule 403 provides for the exclusion of

evidence which wastes time.

Thus, if a witness's opinion will do

little more that tell the jury what result to reach, it will be
inadmissible.'"

Davidson v. Prince, 163 Adv. Rep. at 63 n. 6

citing J. Moore Moore's Federal Practice § 704.02 (1989).
With regard to the bald assertion that the testimony
presented was difficult for a lay person to grasp, the Court of
Appeals expressly noted that:

-7-

Indeed, the only evidence the trial court
excluded was [the expert's] conclusion
regarding whether appellee was negligent.
Additionally, [the expert's] testimony was
not technical or difficult to understand, but
was expressed in lay terms. The trial judge
did not err in excluding Mr. Knight's opinion
testimony that the appellee was negligent.
See Davidson v. Prince, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. 58, 61 (CA, 6/18/91).
Not surprisingly, Davidson cites no portions of the record to
dispute this statement.

In fact, the opinion testimony was

presented in terms that were very easy to understand pursuant to
questions from Davidson's own counsel.
3.

The Court of Appeals Did Not Err in Upholding the Trial
Court's Admission into Evidence of a Factual Statement
in a Demand Letter For Purposes Relating to
Credibility.

Finally, Davidson argues that certiorari is necessary
because he disagrees with the Court of Appeals' determination
that a factual statement admitted into evidence was not part of
any offer to compromise his claim so as to be barred by Rule 408
of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
11-14.

See Petition for Certiorari at p.

Davidson's argument fails, however, because the Court of

Appeals correctly determined that the letter at issue did not
contain any offer to compromise which might be construed as an
admission by the fact finder.

Even if it did, it was offered for

purposes relating credibility and was thus not barred by Rule
408.
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For example, as pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the
policy underlying Rule 408 is grounded on the recognition that
willingness to compromise a claim for less than all that is due
might be construed as an admission of weakness, and settlement
overtures might be adversely affected if compromise efforts that
failed were subsequently admissible at trial.

See Davidson v.

Prince, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 62, citing 10 J. Moore, Moore's
Federal Practice § 408.04 (1988 & Supp. 1990).

An offer or

willingness to compromise, which in turn could be construed as an
admission, is the sine qua non of any communication protected
bnth by the rule and the policy underlying the rule.

Icl.

Davidson points to the last sentence of the letter as that
portion of the communication fulfilling this requirement.
last sentence reads:

The

"You may speak with us directly or we can

send it to lawyers and to court, you decide."

Davidson

completely fails to show, however, how this statement offers to
compromise Davidson's claim for less than all that is due.

In

fact, the sentence simply offers alternatives between voluntarily
paying every bit of Davidson's claim by direct communication with
Davidson himself, or being forced to pay by "lawyers" and "court,
you decide."

There is simply no compromise of Davidson's claim

offered in the letter, and neither the letter or statements
contained therein are protected by Rule 408.
Even if the letter or the statement contained therein were
within the purview of Rule 408, however, which they are not,
-9-

Prince's counsel did not offer the 10-foot statement contained in
the demand letter "to establish liability or invalidity of a
claim" as prohibited by the rule.

Rather, Prince's counsel

offered the 10-foot statement to impeach Davidson's testimony as
to the distance from which he first approached the steer.

The

trial court allowed the 10-foot statement into evidence solely
for that purpose.

Accordingly, Rule 408 does not prohibit the

evidence in any event.
For example, in United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v.
Olympia Wings, Inc., 896 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1990), the court held
that the trial court properly acted within its discretion under
Rule 408 when it admitted evidence of a settlement to impeach the
plaintiff's earlier deposition testimony.

The court stated as

follows:
We are persuaded that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting
evidence of settlement to show the change in
[plaintiff's] position since his deposition
was taken. Fed. R. Evid. 408 permits
settlement evidence for any purpose except to
prove or disprove liability or the amount of
claim. The district court has broad
discretion in determining whether to admit
evidence of settlement for another purpose
and we will not disturb that decision
lightly.
896 F.2d at 956.
This Court has also indicated, in dicta, that this same
exception obtains under Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
In Slusher v. Ospital, 777 P.2d 437 (Utah 1989), the Court stated
-10-

that "[t]aken together, the two statutes resulted in a rule not
unlike Utah Rule of Evidence 408, now in effect.

In other words,

they precluded introduction of the settlement for purposes of
establishing liability but not for purposes relating to
credibility."

Id. at 443 (emphasis added); see also Id. n. 12

(where the Court stated that if Rule 408 applied to the trial in
Slusher, "it even more clearly supports the conclusion we reach
[that evidence of compromise should be allowed for impeachment
purposes].").
CONCLUSION
Prince respectfully submits that for the reasons stated
above the decision of the Court of Appeals was in no way
erroneous, and does not require additional appellate review by
this Court after an already lengthy appellate review process.
Prince requests that the Petition for Certiorari be denied.
DATED this

day of August, 1991.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

H. James Clegg
Robert C. Keller
Attorneys for Appellees
Erwin M. Prince and Folkens
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